Your cloud is an API surface. Management-plane and IAM APIs, serverless HTTP functions, gateway routes, and storage and data-service APIs each accept requests, and each can grant more than it should. Planck Operator tests that API surface across AWS, Azure, and GCP for broken authorization, broken authentication, and injection, and proves every finding, continuously, before an attacker does.
Storage and data-service APIs that return another tenant's object when you change an identifier, broken object level authorization no config scan can see.
IAM and identity APIs that let a workload's token call operations far beyond its role, turning one foothold into broad reach across the account.
Management-plane, gateway, and serverless HTTP APIs left callable without proper authorization, giving an attacker a front door into control operations.
Cloud moves fast, and an API route that was locked last sprint can be over exposed by this one. Planck Operator tests your cloud API surface continuously and non destructively, honoring provider terms and the scope you set, so a new authorization gap becomes a proven finding rather than a breach.
Findings are chained the way a real intrusion would combine them: a leaked service token plus an over permissive IAM role plus a management-plane API that trusts it becomes a real path in, proven end to end.
Testing the API surface of your cloud environment: provider management-plane APIs, IAM and identity APIs, serverless and function HTTP APIs, API gateway configurations, and storage and data-service APIs. Planck Operator tests each operation for broken authorization, broken authentication, and injection across roles, and proves every finding with a reproducible exploit chain rather than a list of unverified misconfiguration alerts.
The major providers permit customer testing of your own resources under their acceptable use terms, and non destructive testing of your own API endpoints and services generally does not require prior approval. Planck Operator runs non destructive by default, scopes to the API base URLs you set, and stays inside the boundary you define.
Broken object and function level authorization on management-plane and service APIs, over permissive IAM roles reachable through identity APIs, unauthenticated or misconfigured API gateway routes, serverless HTTP functions exposed without proper authorization, and storage and data-service APIs that leak across accounts, each chained into the path an attacker would actually take and proven with the exact request and response.
Point the agent at your cloud API surface and get proven findings across AWS, Azure, and GCP.